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Summary: In his book The Nature of Mathematical
Knowledge and in a series of articles, Philip Kitcher at-
tacks the traditional conception of a priori mathematical
knowledge. The reliabilism he develops as an alternative
situates all our knowledge within a psychological frame-
work. However, in Frege’s Epistemology he claims that
Frege’s conception of a priori knowledge is compatible
with a psychological account. Kitcher attributes to Frege
a traditional concept of proof, according to which mathe-
matical and logical proofs are psychological activities. I
shall argue that Kitcher’s interpretation conflicts with
Frege’s anti-psychologistic injunction against confusing
reasons with causes. Moreover, the psychological expla-
nation obscures one of the most interesting features of a
priori knowledge.
1 Kitcher’s definition of a priori knowledge
At first glance, Frege’s and Kitcher’s notions of a priori knowledge
could not differ more. While Frege is a wholehearted rationalist,
Kitcher’s view of the nature of mathematical truth is more or less
that of an empiricist. Frege’s lifelong project was to prove that
arithmetical truths are logical truths. Though we know that this
project was not successful, most of his writings must be read in
the light of the ambitious aim to find a solid foundation for arith-
metic. For Frege psychology is a threat to this project. He pole-
mically complains about “the corrupting incursion of psychology
into logic” (Frege 1964: xiv). Kitcher on the other hand, thinks
that all our knowledge is embedded within a psychological frame-
work which holds that there are causes for believing something – a
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priori knowledge is not supposed to be an exception to this. Kit-
cher’s psychological account of knowledge takes socio-historical
changes in the field of logic and mathematics very seriously, and
undermines the traditional picture of an ever-increasing amount
of a priori knowledge. The traditional concept of a priori know-
ledge turns out to be a myth – a philosopher’s fetish.
Surprisingly, Kitcher does not agree with this contrast. In his ear-
ly paper, ’Frege’s Epistemology’ he ascribes to Frege a psycho-
logistic account of knowledge, which he thinks is consistent with
Frege’s anti-psychologism. I shall argue that this interpretation is
flawed and that Kitcher is reading too much of his own conception
into Frege’s epistemology. In the first section of this paper, Kit-
cher’s definition of a priori knowledge will be outlined. In sections
two and three, I shall discuss his attempt to harmonize Frege’s
notion of proof as a mental activity with his anti-psychologism.
I shall argue that Kitcher’s analysis undermines Frege’s doctrine
to keep apart reasons to believe and causes of belief. On a clo-
se reading one can find in Frege a clear-cut distinction which is
expressed in his use of language; some textual evidence will be
given in section four. In the last section I shall take up Frege’s
idea, that a priori knowledge and understanding are intertwined.
From a naturalistic perspective it is hard to explain a priori know-
ledge, hence many naturalists explain it away. Quine, for instance,
rejects the idea of a priori knowledge because for something to
be known a priori it must be analytically true; and since there
are no analytical truths, there is no a priori. Kitcher vindicates
the possibility of a priori knowledge for naturalistic epistemolo-
gy. He sharpens the Kantian definition of a priori knowledge as
independent of one’s experience. Roughly, knowledge is a priori if
and only if it is produced by a process that would have produced
knowledge no matter what particular experiences one might have
had. Technically, Kitcher’s explication has two parts, the first of
which defines a priori knowledge in terms of warrants, the second
serves as a definition for a priori warrants:
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(1) X knows a priori that p if and only if X knows that p and X’s
belief that p was produced by a process which is an a priori
warrant for it.
(2) α is an a priori warrant for X’s belief that p if and only if α is a
process such that for any sequence of experiences sufficiently
rich for X for p,
(a) some process of the same type could produce in X a belief
that p some process of the same type could produce in X
a belief that p
(b) if a process of the same type were to produce in X a belief
that p, then it would warrant X in believing that p
(c) if a process of the same type were to produce in X a belief
that p, then p.1
Proposition (1) derives from Kitcher’s general psychological ac-
count of knowledge: “X knows that p if and only if X believes
that p and X’s belief that p was produced by a process which
is a warrant for it” (Kitcher 1983: 17). If knowledge is defined
in terms of warrants, then a forteriori a priori knowledge is to
be defined in terms of a priori warrants. In both cases, warrants
are processes which produce beliefs and warrant the beliefs they
produce; e.g. sense perception, mathematical intuition, encyclo-
pedias, along with TV shows and gossipy neighbors.
Proposition (2) defines a priori warrants as independent of experi-
ence. Kitcher is very careful about the independence claim, since
a priori knowledge may include concepts that presuppose expe-
rience. If I have never seen a triangle in my whole life, I cannot
even understand basic geometric truths about triangles. To allow
for the minimal role of experience in a priori knowledge, Kitcher
introduces the notion of sufficiently rich experience. That an ex-
perience is sufficiently rich for me to know that p means that I
have all the concepts needed to entertain p.
Unfortunately, the independence claim cannot be met by the me-
re addition of the counterfactual conditional, that X would have
1 See Kitcher (1980: 9f; 1983: 24; and 2000: 67); with slight modifica-
tions.
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known that p even if X’s experience were different. The difference
between a priori and a posteriori knowledge would collapse, as the
conditions for a priori knowledge would be satisfied already by
X’s empirical knowledge of p. It is obviously wrong to say that X
knows a priori that p, just because X keeps repeating the words
of his teacher. To rule out the possibility of unexpected a priori
knowledge, Kitcher states a direct connection between a priori
warrants and a priori knowledge: If X knows a priori that p, then
X does so, or could have done so, because of an a priori war-
rant, given any sufficiently rich experience. A priori knowledge
is generated by a priori warrants, and an a priori warrant is a
process that generates beliefs independently of experience. Thus
in order to produce knowledge independent of experience, a pro-
cess has (a) to be available independently of experience; (b) it
must produce warranted belief independently of experience; and
(c) it must produce true belief independently of experience; i.e.,
the warrant has to be ultra-reliable.2
Whereas many commentators concentrate on the second part of
Kitcher’s definition, I shall focus on the first part. The thesis
“that the distinction between knowledge and true belief depends
on the characteristics of the process which generates the belief”
(Kitcher 1980: 7) is key to Kitcher’s reliabilistic framework. Its
application to a priori knowledge enables tradition-dependency as
well as socio-historical backgrounds of mathematics and logics, to
be brought in, as Kitcher famously shows. Nevertheless, I shall
question the underlying assumption that the reasons to believe
something a priori can be identified with the processes generating
this belief.
2 In recent discussions Kitcher considers a weak conception based on
condition (a) and a strong conception of the a priori based on all
three conditions (Kitcher 2000), but I shall not investigate this issue
here.
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2 Kitcher on Frege’s epistemology
The very title of Kitcher’s paper, Frege’s Epistemology, presuppo-
ses that Frege deals with epistemological issues. The importance
of this observation cannot be stressed too much, since for a long
time Frege was predominantly seen as a philosopher of langua-
ge and mathematics. Kitcher and others succeeded in changing
this paradigm, interpreting Frege’s work from an epistemologi-
cal point of view. I shall argue that although Kitcher is right to
emphasize Frege’s epistemological motives for logicism, he is ex-
aggerating this view by imputing a kind of psychologism Frege
does not endorse.
Frege’s lifelong project was to find a secure and solid foundation
for mathematical knowledge, and he was convinced that logical
laws would provide such a foundation. By reducing arithmetical
laws to logical laws he hoped to establish the epistemological sta-
tus of arithmetical knowledge, showing, ultimately, how it flows
from pure logic. At the heart of Frege’s logicism lies the con-
viction that mathematical knowledge, in contrast to perceptual
knowledge or knowledge by intuition, is immune from error. But,
if this is the case, are we not entitled to ask, how logical laws are
known? How does it come about that what is known on the basis
of logical laws is superior to other knowledge? Paradoxically, Fre-
ge does not address this kind of question. The situation is even
worse: Frege is not just silent about the nature of mathematical
knowledge, his anti-psychologism seems to block epistemological
discourse within the rigorous science of logic and mathematics.
At this point Kitcher faces a genuine puzzle: If Frege’s motives
for logicism are primarily epistemological, why does he evade epi-
stemological questions?
Kitcher reckons that the answer for Frege’s silence lies in his faith
in Kant: “Frege believed that the basic epistemological issues had
already been settled [by Kant]” (Kitcher 1979: 241). Frege agrees
with Kant’s theory of knowledge, except for the nature of arith-
metical knowledge. While Kant thinks that mathematical intui-
tion is involved in geometry as well as in arithmetic, Frege denies
this for arithmetical truths, as they are analytic. Because of his
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trust in Kant’s theory of knowledge, Frege is reluctant to tackle
the epistemological issues of his logicism. However, Kitcher finds
systematic evidence for the close connection between Frege and
Kant in their notion of proof. He claims that Frege and Kant
share a traditional and non-formal concept of proof; i.e., proofs
are not idealized sequences of symbols, but are “distinguished by
the kind of knowledge they produce” (Kitcher 1979: 242). Ac-
cording to the traditional conception a proof is a “psychological
activity which occurs in the minds of mathematicians. When we
prove a proposition we engage in a special type of activity which
generates a distinctive type of knowledge” (Kitcher 1979: 242).
On the basis of this observation, Kitcher continues to ascribe to
both Frege and Kant what he calls a psychologistic account of
knowledge:
“On the psychologistic account, we suppose that the que-
stion of whether a person’s true belief counts as knowled-
ge depends on whether or not the presence of that true
belief can be explained in an appropriate fashion. The
difference between an item of knowledge and mere true
belief turns on the factors which produced the belief (thus
the issue revolves around the way in which a particular
mental state was generated).” (Kitcher 1979: 243)
Whether a person can be said to know something, according to
the psychologistic account, depends on the characteristics of the
process in her mind. Since proofs are the produce of a highly re-
liable mental process they generate knowledge. It goes without
saying that if Frege has a psychologistic account, it will fit Kit-
cher’s reliabilism very well.
One objection intrudes immediately: How can Frege endorse a
psychologistic account of knowledge, when he misses almost no
opportunity to attack psychological explanations in the field of
logic? Kitcher is well aware of this objection, and he offers a
two-step strategy to refute it: firstly, he quotes various passa-
ges where Frege explicitly claims that proving is a psychological
activity. Secondly, he tries to clarify the nature of Frege’s anti-
psychologism by pointing out that Frege merely opposes the kind
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of psychologism which takes the contents of mathematical judg-
ments to be mental entities. From this he concludes that Frege’s
anti-psychologism is compatible with the psychologistic account
of knowledge (Kitcher 1979: 246). I shall discuss both steps in
detail, but my critique concerns the second step, since Kitcher’s
analysis of Frege’s anti-psychological doctrines is incomplete.
3 Anti-psychologism
Frege’s attacks on psychology are various and it is sometimes dif-
ficult to separate polemical remark from argument. The fact that
he never objects to the idea that judgments are mental processes,
seems to support Kitcher’s attribution of the traditional concept
of proof.3 Against the formalist conception of inference, Frege
claims that an inference does not belong to the “realm of signs”
but is the “pronouncement of a judgment” (Frege 1984: 318). The
expression “judgment” is clearly disambiguated here; it refers to
the act of judging, not to the result of such an act. In a letter
to Husserl, Frege admits that it is not counter to the purpose of
the Begriffsschrift “if it occasions entirely new mental processes”
(Frege 1980: 67). Probably the most explicit statement about in-
ference as a psychological activity can be found in a letter to
Jourdain, who asks, whether Frege regards judgment (`) as me-
rely psychological. Frege answers that judging is an inner mental
process, but that nonetheless something, if true, is objective and
independent of the recognizer (Frege 1980: 78). Although Kitcher
does not refer to it, this passage supports his interpretation extre-
mely well: all inferences are judgments, to judge is a psychological
activity, therefore inference is a psychological activity too. Yet,
it does not enable the conclusion that an inference is nothing but
the performance of a psychological act.
The second step in Kitcher’s attempt to combine Frege’s anti-
3 Note that Frege’s key epistemological concept is not belief or know-
ledge but judgment. Logical inferences are kinds of judgments; i.e.
judgments made on the basis of other judgments.
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psychologism with the psychologistic account of knowledge is pro-
blematic. He summarizes Frege’s doctrines as follows:
(a) logic does not record our actual thought processes
(b) truth is not what humans agree on
(c) the meaning of an expression is not an idea
(d) numbers are not mental entities4
On the basis of this list, Kitcher concludes that Frege’s anti-
psychologistic doctrines do not rule out the psychologistic account
of knowledge:
“One can believe that the difference between knowled-
ge and true belief is to be found in the nature of the
factors which produced the belief in the knower, one can
regard inference as a mental process to which the laws
of logic prescribe, and one can view proofs as codificati-
ons of ideal inferential processes, processes which produce
certain knowledge, without committing oneself to any of
the complex doctrines which Frege, correctly, spurned.”
(Kitcher 1979: 248; my italics)
Elsewhere Kitcher is very explicit about these factors being cau-
sal factors. He supposes that Frege would accept the following as-
sumption: “With respect to any item of knowledge there must be
a tree-like structure which represents the causal process through
which the belief in question is produced” (Kitcher 1986: 302).
If Kitcher is right, then Frege’s derivations in the Begriffsschrift
and in the Grundgesetze are designed to represent causal chains
for believing the truth of mathematical formulas.
But Frege explicitly denies that our reasons for knowing some-
thing can be traced back to what causes our beliefs: “Although
each judgement we make is causally conditioned, it is neverthe-
less not the case that all these causes are grounds that afford a
justification” (Frege 1979: 2). Frege agrees that every judgment
has its causes, but contrary to Kitcher, he does not derive the
4 See Kitcher (1979: 248).
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conclusion that causal processes may also serve as a proof. He
seems to think that causes belong to the realm of psychology and
merely tell a generic story about the judgments they produce:
“Clearly such an account of how men have come to hold some-
thing to be true is no proof” (Frege 1979: 3). Frege denies that
psychology can contribute anything to the foundation of arith-
metic, because this would “let us take the origin of an idea [...]
or an account of the mental act and physical conditions on which
we become conscious of a proposition for a proof of it” (Frege
1960: vi). With any psychologistic account to logic “we lose the
distinction between the grounds that justify a conviction and the
causes that actually produce it” (Frege 1979: 147). These remarks
suggest another doctrine of Frege’s:
(e) never confuse the reasons to believe something with its causes
If we amend the list of anti-psychologistic doctrines by adding (e),
we can no longer attribute to Frege a psychologistic account of
knowledge, because it conflicts with the claim that knowledge is a
matter of the factors producing the belief in the knower. Kitcher
seems to think that we can grant that the objects of judgments
are not ideas [Vorstellungen] and still attribute to Frege the view
that judgments are nothing but psychological acts. But Frege’s
anti-psychologism denies both the psychological understanding of
the content of a judgment as well as the purely psychological un-
derstanding of the act of judging. Though he would agree with
Kitcher that causal processes are going on when we draw conclu-
sions from premises, he thinks that we commit a genetic fallacy
when we take the causes to justify the conclusion.
4 Judgment and holding to be true
In this section the tension between Frege’s anti-psychologism and
his concession to the psychological reality of judgments shall be
resolved. On close inspection of Frege’s writings one can find a
clear-cut distinction between justificatory and genetic aspects of
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judgments, that mirrors his use of language. For the sake of di-
sambiguation Frege deliberately uses the verb “holding/taking to
be true” [fu¨rwahrhalten], when the causes of a judgment are at
issue; whereas his use of “judgment” or “judging” alludes to the
justificatory aspects of a judgment:
“Error and superstition have causes just as much as cor-
rect cognition. Whether what you take for true is false or
true, your so taking it comes about in accordance with
psychological laws. A derivation from these laws, and an
explanation of a mental process that ends in taking so-
mething to be true, can never take the place of proving
what is taken to be true.” (Frege 1918: 58f.)
Here, the verb “taking for true” clearly has a psychological con-
notation – it serves as a vehicle for alleged judgments; i.e., judg-
ments that lack justification. Error and superstition, as well as
judgments, have causes, but in contrast to judgments a false be-
lief has no justificatory aspects. Note that Frege never uses the
expression “false judgment” for he seems to be convinced that
judgments expressing false thoughts are “logically useless” (Fre-
ge 1980: 79). Hence, I can hold to be true what is objectively
false, but this is different with judgment. Judgments may have
causes too, but they do not give rise to judgments, for they can
“never take the place of a proof”.
Frege seems to suggest that judgments have psychological and ju-
stificatory aspects. Judgments are psychological acts in the sense
that they are mental acts that people perform: “Both grasping a
thought and making a judgment are acts of a knowing subject,
and are to be assigned to psychology” (Frege 1979: 253). However,
this is not exhaustive, because the causal history of a judgment
does not reveal the grounds by which one judges. Hence, with re-
gards to its justification a judgment is a logical act, or a “logically
primitive activity [logische Urta¨tigkeit ]” (Frege 1979: 15).
The idea of covering the psychological aspect of judgments with
the notion of “taking to be true”, goes back to Kant: “Taking
something to be true [Fu¨rwahrhalten] is an occurrence in our un-
derstanding that may rest on objective grounds, but that also
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requires subjective causes in the mind of him who judges” (Kant
1998: A820/B848). Thus, whether or not Frege and Kant share
a traditional conception of proof, as Kitcher claims, they both
respect the distinction between reasons and causes to believe. A
judgment as a mental act is a holding-to-be-true, but regardless
of its psychological reality it is still a judgment, which is in need
of justification. One will find the term “holding to be true” in
other contexts as well, nonetheless, Frege’s use of language is de-
liberate. He applies the phrase of holding to be true when the
grounds for justification are doubtful or missing, as in cases of
error and conflicting beliefs (Frege 1892: 32; 1918: 69). The sa-
me holds for his rejection of psychologistic logic, which he thinks
tries to reduce the laws of being true to “laws of holding as true
[Gesetze des Fu¨rwahrhaltens]” (Frege, 1964: xv-xvii).
5 Frege’s concept of a priori
So far we have dealt with Frege’s general conception of knowled-
ge, not with his conception of a priori knowledge specifically. In
this section I shall take up Kitcher’s complaint that Frege does
not address the question of how the foundation of logicism are
to be known. On closer inspection, Frege gives some hints about
how he thinks axioms and rules of inference are known. This final
section does not present an argument for an alternative charac-
terization of a priori knowledge, rather it suggests, along Frege’s
line of thinking, that any account of a priori knowledge should
allow for the concept of understanding.
For Frege the distinction between a priori and a posteriori does
not apply to the content of a judgment but to its justification:
“Now these distinctions between a priori and a posteriori, syn-
thetic and analytic, concern, as I see it, not the content of the
judgement but the justification for making the judgement” (Fre-
ge 1960: § 3). It is not what is judged or known is a priori, but
the way a judgment is justified that is a priori or a posteriori.
Though Frege does not discriminate further, the same holds for
the analytic/synthetic distinction. Subsequent to his definition of
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natural numbers in the Grundlagen, Frege summarizes his con-
clusion: “I hope I may claim in the present work to have made it
probable that the laws of arithmetic are analytic judgements and
consequently a priori” (Frege 1960: § 87). Hence, Frege seems to
think that analyticity implies apriority: If p is analytically true,
then the judgment that p can be justified a priori.
In Frege’s technical writings the notions of apriority and analyti-
city almost disappear, instead the notion of self-evidence comes
into focus. For Frege the truth of a thought is self-evident, if and
only if nothing but its understanding is required for acknowledg-
ment (Frege 1960: § 90). However, when Frege introduces his very
first axiom in the Begriffsschrift, he seems to feel forced to give
a justification for its truth:
“` a →(b→a) says ‘The case in which a is denied, b is
affirmed, and a is affirmed is excluded’. This is evident,
since a cannot at the same time be denied and affirmed.
We can also express the judgment in words thus, ‘If a
proposition a holds, then it also holds in case an arbitrary
proposition b holds.’ (Frege 1879: § 14; my italics)”5
But axioms are self-evident and not in need of a justification.
This follows from Frege’s own characterization: “The axioms are
truths [...], but they are truths for which no proof can be given
in our system, and for which no proof is needed” (Frege 1979:
205). So why does Frege feel forced to give a justification for it
in the quoted passage?
Burge (1998: 317) suggests the sentence be read as emphasizing
not an expression of our reasons, but as an elucidation of our
understanding of Frege’s first axiom. This calls attention to
an interesting feature of a priori knowledge: the distinction
between understanding an axiom and the recognition of its truth
collapses, for we cannot understand an axiom without accepting
its truth. In Fregean terms this means that the grasping of an
axiomatic thought implies the judgment that the thought is true.
5 We can find similar remarks in the Grundgesetze § 12 and in § 6 of
the Begriffsschrift when Frege explains modus ponens.
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This observation gives rise to an alternative characterization
of a priori knowledge, which includes human understanding
rather than a priori warrants: the collapsing of understanding
and judgment serves as a condition for a priori knowledge. A
definition of a priori knowledge should not merely consist of
conditions for what qualifies as a priori knowledge, but should
say something about what it means to know a priori. The
collapse of the distinction between understanding and judgment
is an interesting feature, which any account of a priori knowledge
has to consider.
A definition of a priori knowledge along these lines does not
exclude socio-historical changes in the field of mathematics and
logic. The background for our understanding may change. If
we accept Kitcher’s invitation and look back at the history of
mathematical knowledge, we have to understand the relevant
concepts used by the key historical figures, as they themselves
understood them. Moreover, a definition of a priori knowledge
in terms of understanding would give an explanation as to why
mathematical statements can be puzzling. If you look at Frege’s
first axiom with the eyes of a young logic student, you may be
puzzled by the thought that if a proposition is true, it is implied
by any other proposition. Because of such puzzlement, this axiom
represents one of the ‘paradoxes’ of material implication. Or,
to give a less familiar example, one may be puzzled by the
thought that for any two propositions one is either necessary
or sufficient for the other. Yet, as soon as we understand the
concept of a truth-functional conditional, the fog lifts. These
examples show how understanding may take some time, but
when we understand a proposition that can be known a priori,
we no longer hesitate to accept its truth. Thus, an alternative
characterization of a priori knowledge which takes the notion of
understanding seriously, allows for a minimal role for experience,
as well.
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